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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the court of appeals correctly reversed the jury verdict of no causation 
on grounds unrelated to the verdict or the issues raised by the parties. 
2. Whether the court of appeals correctly ruled that jury instructions 16a and 21a 
regarding proof of negligence and proximate cause misstate Utah law and require a new 
trial. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The slip opinion of the court of appeals is reproduced in the Appendix hereto 
(App. 1-10, hereafter referred to as "Slip Op.") and is reported at 142 U.A.R. 27 (Utah 
App. 1990). The Special Verdict of the jury and Final Judgment of the district court are 
also set forth in the Appendix. (App. 11-17.) 
JURISDICTION 
The decision of the court of appeals was entered August 31, 1990. On September 
26, 1990 this Court entered an Order extending the time within which to petition for 
certiorari to October 31, 1990. This Court has jurisdiction to review the court of appeals 
decision by a writ of certiorari pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5). 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES 
This case is governed by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 49, 51, 59, and 61, which 
are set out verbatim in the Appendix. (App. 37-42.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action in which plaintiff alleges that the injuries and 
death of his wife, Betty George, were caused by the negligent care of her physicians, Dr. 
Kimball Lloyd and Dr. Michael Lahey, and LDS Hospital (the "Hospital"). The defendant 
physicians entered into a settlement with plaintiff prior to trial. They nevertheless 
remained parties and were represented at trial for the purpose of apportioning any liability 
of the defendants. (Slip Op. at 1; R. 2; PL Opening Statement p. 21; Trial Transcript, 
hereafter "Tr.,f, p. 853.) Following a jury trial, the jury rendered a Special Verdict finding 
that the defendant physicians were not negligent, that the Hospital nurses and respiratory 
therapists were negligent, but that their negligence was not a proximate cause of Mrs. 
George's injuries and death. (Slip Op. at 1; R. 397, App. 11.) Plaintiff filed a motion for 
new trial, which was denied. The district court subsequently entered its Final Judgment 
on the verdict in favor of all three defendants. (Slip Op. at 2; R. 587, 709, App. 15.) 
Plaintiff appealed, challenging the refusal and giving of certain jury instructions 
related to proof of causation, the Special Verdict form, and other minor rulings. (Slip Op. 
at 2; R. 739.) The court of appeals, in an opinion authored by Judge Davidson, who was 
not present at the oral argument and who resigned from the court the same day the 
opinion was released, set aside the jury verdict and ordered a new trial on grounds wholly 
unrelated to the verdict and the issues raised by the parties. The court held that a new 
trial was required because jury instructions 16a and 21a, detailed hereafter, precluded the 
jury from considering expert testimony on breach of duty and from finding Hospital 
negligence a contributing cause of Mrs. George's death. (Slip Op. at 5, 7, 9.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Betty George was a 51-year-old woman with a long history of health problems, 
including diabetes, hypertension, and obesity. In the summer of 1986, Mrs. George was 
found to have a tumor in her uterus and also began experiencing continuous vaginal 
bleeding. For these latter problems she was referred to Dr. Kimball Lloyd, a specialist 
in obstetrics and gynecology. Dr. Lloyd admitted Mrs. George to LDS Hospital on July 
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28, 1986 for exploratory surgery and a hysterectomy. Dr. Lloyd performed the surgery the 
next day without apparent complication. (Slip Op. at 2; Partial Transcript, hereafter Tart. 
Tr.H, at 36-45; Tr. 351, 359; Trial Exhibit, hereafter "Ex.", 1 pp. 4, 12, 56.) 
On August 1, Mrs. George began showing signs of a respiratory problem. Dr. 
Lloyd ordered various tests to determine the cause of the problem, but the results were 
inconclusive. Dr. Lloyd then contacted Dr. Michael Lahey, a specialist in internal 
medicine, to assist him in diagnosing the problem. After Dr. Lahey examined Mrs. 
George and her test results that evening, both doctors diagnosed the problem as 
pulmonary embolism, which is the presence of a blood clot in the lungs that prevents 
oxygenation of the blood and results in shortness of breath (hypoxemia). However, a 
pulmonary angiogram performed the morning of August 2, failed to confirm this diagnosis. 
Dr. Lahey examined Mrs. George again following the angiogram and found her condition 
generally the same as the previous evening. (Slip Op. at 2; Tr. 82-83, 368-85, 504-15, 566-
86; Ex. 1 pp. 13, 90.) 
Mrs. George was returned to her room at approximately 2:30 p.m. and was 
assigned a special duty nurse. Her condition began to show signs of worsening during the 
later afternoon of August 2. The nurse summoned Dr. Adams, a resident physician, who 
examined Mrs. George and called Dr. Lloyd at 4:15 p.m. Dr. Lloyd ordered certain tests 
for infection, but because he did not issue the order "stat," requiring immediate 
performance, the test results were not expected for two to three hours. Dr. Adams 
examined Mrs. George again at 5:00 p.m. and found no change from the previous 
examination. At 6:30 p.m. Dr. Adams received some of the requested test results, ordered 
medication, and instructed the nurse to call him immediately to report any changes in the 
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patient's mental status. The nurse called Dr. Adams at 7:00 p.m. and reported that Mrs. 
George was not responsive. Dr. Adams went directly to examine Mrs. George and, 
finding no heart rate, summoned the emergency resuscitation team, but the team was 
unable to revive her. Dr. lioyd and Dr. Lahey subsequently diagnosed Mrs. George's 
condition as sepsis, an overwhelming bacterial infection. (Slip Op. at 2-3; Tr. 85-86, 390-
404, 586-97, 689-716; Ex. 1 pp. 32, 169-71.) 
Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action asserting both wrongful death and 
survival claims on behalf of the heirs and the estate. As noted previously, the defendant 
physicians settled with plaintiff out of court, but were represented as parties at trial for 
purposes of apportioning liability. (Slip Op. at 1; R. 2; PL Open. Stat. p. 21; Tr. 853.)' 
At trial, plaintiff presented the expert testimony of Harriet Gillerman, a nurse, 
and Donald Owing, a respiratory therapist, regarding the standards of hospital care, the 
claimed breach of those standards, and the claimed result in proximately causing Mrs. 
George's injuries and death. (Tr. 169, 276.) Plaintiff presented no expert testimony from 
a physician regarding the breach of duty and proximate cause of the injuries and death, 
although he had previously secured such a witness. The Hospital, on the other hand, 
presented the expert testimony of three physicians, Dr. John Trowbridge, an expert in the 
diagnosis of infectious processes; Dr. Louis Weinstein, an expert in obstetrical and 
gynecological infections; and Dr. Charles Elliot, an expert in respiratory medicine. All 
three physicians testified that Mrs. George's arrest was caused by sepsis, probably 
emanating from the surgery; that the process of cascading infection was irreversible by the 
1
 Plaintiff initially alleged that the Hospital was vicariously liable for the negligence of the student resident physicians, 
including Doctors Bearnson, Adams and others, who were employed by the University of Utah Medical Center. (R. 9.) 
However, consistent with the law, plaintiff later abandoned that theory, and the jury was properly instructed that no failure 
of any of the physicians, including the student residents, could be attributed to the Hospital. (Instruction 31, R. 529.) 
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time Mrs. George returned from the ICU on the afternoon of August 2; and that nothing 
the Hospital staff could have done after that time would have changed her condition or 
prevented her death. (Trowbridge: Tr. 530-41; Weinstein: Tr. 640-44, 656-58; Elliot: Tr. 
752-64, 772-73, 780-81.) The jury obviously accorded more weight and credibility to the 
Hospital's experts, finding in a Special Verdict that while the Hospital staff breached the 
standard of care, that breach was not the proximate cause of Mrs. George's injuries and 
death. (Slip Op. at 1, 5-8; R. 397-99, App. 11-14.) The district court entered Final 
Judgment in favor of the defendants, and plaintiff appealed, challenging principally the 
jury instructions related to proof of causation. (R. 709, App. 15-17, R. 739.) 
Plaintiff argued in the court of appeals that the verdict should be set aside because 
(1) the district court refused plaintiffs proposed jury instructions 24 and 32 pertaining to 
"increased risk of injury" and "lost chance of survival"; (2) jury instructions 16a and 21a 
erroneously required plaintiff to establish the proximate cause of Mrs. George's death 
through expert physician testimony; (3) the Special Verdict form failed to allow 
consideration of pre-death injuries; (4) the district court improperly denied plaintiffs 
motion for directed verdict in favor of the defendant physicians; and (5) the district court 
erred in the amount of costs awarded.2 The Hospital countered that (1) there was no 
error in the refusal of proposed jury instructions 24 and 32 because plaintiff failed to 
object to the refusal, and the proposed instructions are contrary to Utah law; (2) jury 
instructions 16a and 21a accurately set forth Utah law regarding the manner and burden 
of proving causation; (3) plaintiffs challenge to the Special Verdict form was not timely 
raised, and the language did cover pre-death injuries; (4) there was sufficient evidence of 
2
 Plaintiffs arguments in his brief to the court of appeals were numerous, ill-defined, scattered, and repetitious. This 
summary represents a good faith effort to distill plaintiff's arguments into the major points. 
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the physicians' negligence to preclude a directed verdict; and (5) there was no error in the 
award of costs. 3 
The court of appeals opinion focuses exclusively on the challenge to jury 
instructions 16a and 21a (Slip Op. at 4-5); all other issues were disregarded. Moreover, 
the court examined those instructions on narrow grounds unrelated to the verdict or the 
parties' actual arguments. The court reviewed the testimony of plaintiffs experts, Owings 
and Gillerman, but only insofar as it pertained to the Hospital's breach of duty. The 
court then held the instructions deficient, not on grounds related to causation, but because 
(1) they prevented the jury from considering plaintiffs expert testimony on breach of duty 
(Slip Op. at 5-7); and (2) they "improperly implied that the jury could find only one 
proximate cause of Mrs. George's death" (id. at 9). Based on these supposed errors, the 
court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial against the Hospital alone. (Id.) 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 46(c), Utah R. App. P., states that this Court may grant review by writ of 
certiorari "[w]hen a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings . . . as to call for an 
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision." This is just such a case. The 
appeal raised several important issues, but the court of appeals failed to address any of 
them. The verdict for the Hospital was based on absence of proximate cause, and the 
arguments of the parties on appeal focused on the issue of proximate cause; yet, the 
court of appeals decision is based on breach of duty, which neither party questioned. The 
plaintiff did not even challenge the jury instructions on the grounds relied upon by the 
3
 Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court obtain copies of the parties' briefs from the court of appeals to verify 
the scope and content of the respective arguments. 
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court of appeals. Moreover, the grounds relied upon are without support in the record 
or the law. If the court of appeals decision is permitted to stand, it will infuse 
unnecessary conflict and confusion into the law of medical malpractice and negligence law 
generally. Additionally, the issues that should have been decided by the court of appeals 
are important questions of first impression which should be settled by this Court. See 
generally Rule 46, Utah R. App. P. 
POINT I: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REVERSED THE JURY 
VERDICT OF NO CAUSATION ON GROUNDS UNRELATED TO THE 
VERDICT AND THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PARTIES. 
The court of appeals opinion violates several long-established rules of appellate 
review. The function of an appellate court is to resolve appeals based on the issues 
actually decided in the trial court and fairly presented on appeal. See, e.g., Chase v. State 
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 131 Ariz. 461, 641 P.2d 1305, 1307 n.2 (App. 1982). On 
appeal from a jury verdict, the appellate court must begin with the presumption that the 
verdict is correct. Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 
P.2d 935, 938 (1960). The court must view the verdict and the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party, accord the evidence every reasonable inference in 
support of the verdict, and assume that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence 
which support the verdict. The reviewing court may reverse a jury verdict only if the 
supporting evidence is so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust. Above all, the appellate court may not substitute its judgment 
for that of the jury. See EA. Strout Western Realty Agency v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 
P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1983); Deals 
v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Utah App. 1987). The burden is on 
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the appellant to show not only that there was error, but that it was prejudicial to the 
extent that in its absence there would have been a different result. Joseph, supra, 348 
P.2d at 938. 
In this case, the court of appeals totally missed the major issues, construed the facts 
against the verdict, and searched beyond the parties' arguments for supposed grounds to 
substitute its judgment for that of the jury. The entire decision is based on alleged error 
in two jury instructions, 16a and 21a, pertaining to proof of negligence generally and 
causation specifically. The two errors identified by the court of appeals are that the 
challenged instructions (1) precluded the jury from considering the testimony of plaintiffs 
experts on breach of duty; and (2) precluded the jury from finding that Hospital 
negligence was a contributing proximate cause of the claimed injuries. Neither assigned 
error has any basis in fact or law. 
A. Expert Testimony 
As documented in the Statement of Facts, the Special Verdict asked the jury three 
basic questions: First, whether the defendants were negligent; second, if so, whether such 
negligence was the proximate cause of the claimed injuries; and third, if there was 
negligence and causation, the amount of damages attributable to each defendant. (App. 
11-13.) 4 The jury found that the Hospital was negligent, but that its negligence was not 
the proximate cause of the claimed injuries. (App. 12-13.) Consequently, the primary 
issue on appeal, stated by plaintiff in various repetitious ways, was not whether the 
4
 "Negligence" was defined in jury instructions 22 through 30 to mean, in essence, the failure of a defendant to 
provide the standard of care provided by other reasonably prudent health care practitioners under similar circumstances. 
(App. 25-34.) "Proximate cause" was defined in jury instructions 21 and 21a to mean, in essence, the act or omission that, 
in natural and continuous sequence produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. (App. 
23-24.) 
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Hospital breached its duty to Mrs. George, but whether that breach proximately caused 
her death. Plaintiff argued on appeal that jury instructions 16a and 21a precluded the jury 
from finding proximate cause because they required that causation be established through 
expert testimony from a duly qualified medical doctor. At trial, for whatever reason, 
plaintiff had determined not to call his expert physician witness and introduced expert 
testimony only from a nurse and respiratory therapist. The Hospital demonstrated that 
the instructions were consistent with Utah law and that plaintiff should bear the 
consequences of his counsel's conscious decision not to call his expert physician witness 
to testify. The issue thus framed was not whether the challenged jury instructions 
precluded the jury from considering plaintiffs expert testimony on breach of duty, but 
whether they precluded the jury from considering the expert testimony on causation. 
The court began by rehashing all the facts relevant to breach of duty, and stated 
those facts in a light favorable to plaintiff. The court then reviewed the testimony of 
plaintiffs two experts, again, not with respect to causation, but for evidence of breach of 
duty. The court cited testimony of both experts that Hospital employees "breached their 
duty" to Mrs. George. (Slip Op. at 5-6.) The court of appeals summarized and 
concluded: 
The record clearly indicates, however, that Gillerman and Owings testified 
only to the standards of care in their respective fields. . . . [Y]et the court, 
through the jury instructions, prevented the jury from considering their 
testimony. 
. . . Plaintiffs experts testified as to the hospital's standard of care, 
the hospital's failure through its employees to meet this standard, and Mrs. 
George's subsequent cardiac arrest. 
The jury must be allowed to decide whether the hospital's failure to notify 
the doctors of Mrs. George's change in medical status . . . was a breach of 
the duty owed to Mrs. George. The trial court erred in not allowing the jury 
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to base its decision on the plaintiffs' expert testimony. [Slip Op. at 6-7, 
emp. added.] 
The court made no mention of causation. Nor did the court bother to identify the 
language in jury instructions 16a and 21a that it considered objectionable. The court 
simply held, with regard to plaintiffs experts, that the challenged jury instructions 
somehow precluded the jury from considering their testimony on "breach of the duty." 
Obviously, the court of appeals confused the issues. The record plainly shows that 
the jury did consider plaintiffs evidence on breach of duty. The jury found that the 
Hospital was negligent. Plaintiff does not need a new trial for the jury "to decide whether 
the hospital's failure . . . was a breach of the duty." Accordingly, the court of appeals 
ruling regarding the effect of the instructions on plaintiffs expert testimony is erroneous. 
B. Contributing Causation 
In the second part of its opinion, the court of appeals misconstrued another issue. 
Plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court erred in refusing his proposed jury 
instructions 24 and 32 pertaining to "increased risk of injury" and "lost chance of survival." 
(App. 35-36.) The claimed effect was to preclude a finding that the Hospital's negligence 
was a contributing cause of Mrs. George's death. The Hospital demonstrated that there 
was no error because plaintiff failed to object to the refusal, and such instructions are 
contrary to Utah law. With the issue thus framed, the court of appeals launched into a 
discussion of whether jury instructions 16a and 21a precluded a finding of contributing 
causation. Viewing the facts in a light favorable to plaintiff, the court concluded: 
A jury could have reasonably concluded that the failure of the nurses 
to notify Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. George's change in condition 
prevented them from diagnosing, treating, and possibly saving her life and 
that this failure therefore was a proximate cause of her worsened condition 
and ensuing death. [Citation omitted.] The trial court's jury instructions 
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therefore improperly implied that the jury could find only one proximate 
cause of Mrs. George's death. [Slip Op. at 9.] 
This reasoning is hopelessly flawed and confused. The court makes no mention of 
proposed instructions 24 and 32, on which plaintiff based the argument. Moreover, the 
court offers no explanation of how jury instructions 16a and 21a, on which the court bases 
its opinion, implied that there could only be one proximate cause. The court simply 
remands for a new trial, without explaining which jury instructions should or should not 
be included. Proposed instructions 24 and 32 have no basis in Utah law, and the actual 
jury instructions do not preclude a finding of more than one proximate cause, as 
demonstrated hereafter. Moreover, instead of searching the record for what the jury 
"could have reasonably concluded," the court should have been reviewing the record for 
evidence to support the verdict. Accordingly, the decision must be reversed. 
In summary, the court of appeals opinion plainly calls for the exercise of this 
Court's power of supervision. 
POINT II: JURY INSTRUCTIONS 16A AND 21A CORRECTLY STATE UTAH 
LAW ON PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE AND 
DO NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE JURY VERDICT. 
As stated in Rule 51, Utah R. Civ. P. (App. 39), review of jury instructions is 
discretionary with the appellate court. On appeal, no party may assign as error the giving 
of a jury instruction unless specific objection was made to the instruction at trial. See EA. 
Strout Western Realty, supra, 665 P.2d at 1322. The giving of a challenged instruction is 
reversible error only if it tends to confuse or mislead the jury to the prejudice of the 
complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises on the law. See, e.g., Mikkelsen 
v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App. 1988); Steele v. Breinholt, 141 P.2d 433, 435 
(Utah App. 1987). Jury instructions must be examined as a whole, and the giving or 
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refusal of an instruction is not prejudicial if the matter is fairly and adequately covered 
in other instructions. Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 638, 640 (Utah 1987); Bigler 
v. Mapleton Irrigation Canal Co., 669 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1983). Under these standards 
of review, there is no reversible error in jury instructions 16a and 21a. 
A. Instructions 16a and 21a Correctly State Utah Law 
The court of appeals quoted jury instructions 16a and 21a, but gave no discussion 
of their content. (Slip Op. at 4-5.) Instruction 16a sets forth the required elements of 
proof for recovery in a medical malpractice action. It states that plaintiff cannot recover 
against defendants unless he proves that (1) one of the defendants breached their duty of 
care to Mrs. George; (2) the breach was the proximate cause of Mrs. George's death; and 
(3) plaintiff, on behalf of the heirs and estate, incurred a resulting injury. (App. 21-22.) 
Instruction 21a sets forth the required proof for the proximate cause element of the cause 
of action. It states that if plaintiff does not establish the proximate cause of Mrs. 
George's death "based on reasonable medical probability from testimony of a medical 
doctor, but is left to conjecture or speculation and may be reasonably attributed to causes 
over which the hospital or doctor had no control or responsibility, then the plaintiff has 
failed to sustain the burden of proof as to proximate causation." (App. 24.) These 
instructions are consistent with well-established Utah law. 
Medical negligence must be established through expert testimony to a degree of 
reasonable medical probability. As stated in Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 
740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987): 
In medical malpractice actions the plaintiff must provide expert 
testimony to establish: 1) the standard of care; 2) defendant's failure to 
comply with that standard; and 3) that defendant caused plaintiffs injuries. 
Further, issues of fact which are outside the knowledge and experience of 
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lay persons must be established by expert testimony. [Citations omitted.] 
The Hoopiiaina court affirmed summary judgment for the hospital because the plaintiff 
failed to establish causation through expert medical testimony. Id. See also Farrow v. 
Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 1979); Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 
n.17 (Utah 1980)(proof of proximate cause "requires some expert testimony in medical 
malpractice cases"); Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523, 526 (1957)("in a 
malpractice action, expert testimony must be produced to show that the injuries alleged 
were probably caused by the lack of due care of defendant"); Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 
814, 816 (Utah 1978)(approved expert opinion "with probable medical certainty as to what 
caused the injuries"). 
Moreover, in the present case, causation must be established through expert 
medical testimony of a physician, rather than that of merely a nurse or respiratory 
therapist, as offered by plaintiff. In Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772, 773 
(1951), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The better-reasoned cases announce a rule of law to the effect that 
in those cases which depend upon knowledge of the scientific effect of 
medicine, the results of surgery, or whether the attending physician exercised 
the ordinary care, skill and knowledge required of doctors in the community 
which he serves, must ordinarily be established by the testimony of physicians 
and surgeons. [Emp. added.] 
The Court reaffirmed this requirement in Huggins v. Hicken, supra, holding that the 
standard for postoperative care of a gall bladder patient "should be established by the 
testimony of physicians and surgeons." 310 P.2d at 525. The reasons for this requirement 
are two-fold. First, evaluation and determination of a medical condition and its cause 
comprise the essence of "diagnosis," which, under Utah law, constitutes the "practice of 
medicine," and can be engaged in only by a licensed physician. U.C.A. 58-12-28; Tolman 
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v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D. Utah 1986). Second, an expert in one 
field of medicine is not qualified to testify on matters uniquely within the knowledge of 
experts in a higher, more complex, or more specialized field of medicine. See Burton v. 
Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985); Novey v. Kishwaukee Community Health 
Services Center, 531 N.E.2d 427 (III App. 1988). Accordingly, neither a nurse nor a 
respiratory therapist is qualified to testify as to the cause of Mrs. George's death. See 
Jones v. Wike, 654 F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1981) (registered nurse not qualified as expert 
on post operative care of hernia patient). Cases dealing with injuries of uncertain origin, 
such as sepsis, require expert physician testimony. See Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 
139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943) (failure to diagnose "general septicemia"); Forrest v. Eason, 123 
Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178, 180 (1953) (brain injury related to bacteriemia); Marsh v. 
Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959) (death of foot tissue following triple 
arthrodesis). 
The law requires proof of proximate cause to a degree of "reasonable medical 
probability" because a showing of mere "increased risk of injury" or "reduced chance of 
recovery" is too speculative. For example, in the leading case of Edwards v. Clark, 96 
Utah 121, 83 P.2d 1021 (1938), the Court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant 
physicians on facts similar to those of the present case. The plaintiffs wife gave birth to 
a child; the mother seemed fine until about four days later when she developed a fever 
and high pulse rate; her doctors examined her periodically and prescribed certain 
medication, but did not discover her uterine infection for four more days; she died two 
days later of septic toxemia. Id, 83 P.2d at 1023. Regarding the deficiency of evidence 
on causation, the Court stated: 
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There is nothing arising out of the case that shows anything the defendants 
could or should have done that would or could have changed the unfortunate 
result. . . . 
. . . That there might have been neglect or lack of skill is not enough. 
To permit a cause to go to the jury on testimony showing only possibility, 
or what might or could have happened, is to permit a jury to base a verdict 
upon conjecture, speculation or suspicion. [Id. at 1029-30.] 
See also Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257, 263, 265 (1931) ("[I]t is not enough to 
show the injury, together with the expert opinion that it might have occurred from 
negligence and many other causes. Such evidence has no tendency to show that 
negligence did cause the injury." Emp. added.) 
Plaintiff would have the jury presume causation from the co-existence of Mrs. 
George's suffering and the Hospital's negligence. However, ff[t]he fact that the plaintiff 
was injured does not raise a presumption or authorize an inference that the defendants' 
acts or omissions proximately caused the injury." Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 
P.2d 566, 569 (1949). Moreover, "[t]here is nothing unlawful or inconsistent in a jury's 
finding that while a defendant is negligent, his negligence did not proximately cause the 
plaintiffs injury." Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah 
1981). A plaintiff may not "rest his case on the mere facts of his sufferings, and . . . rely 
upon the jury's untutored sympathies, without attempting specifically to evidence the 
defendant's unskillfulness as the cause of those sufferings." Baxter v. Snow, supra, 2 P.2d 
at 265. 
In summary, jury instructions 16a and 21a correctly state the law of Utah regarding 
proof of causation through expert medical testimony. 
B. Plaintiff Did Not Specifically Object To The Instructions 
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As noted above, Rule 51, U.R. Civ. P., requires that a party objecting to the giving 
of a jury instruction "must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds 
for his objection." (Add. 39; see also Rule 49, App. 37.) Nonspecific objections, such as 
the instruction "is not supported by the evidence" or "does not correctly state the law," are 
insufficient to apprise the district court of the claimed error. Beehive Medical Electronics, 
Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1983). Moreover, "[e]xpansion on 
nonspecific objections in a motion for a new trial or in a brief on appeal, as plaintiff did 
in this case, does not cure the lack of timeliness in making proper objections to the trial 
court." Id. See also Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah 
1985). At trial, plaintiff objected to instruction 16a solely on the grounds that it ,!was 
confusing to the jury" and "is also contrary to law." (Tr. 894-97.) These grounds are not 
sufficiently specific. Plaintiff objected to instruction 21a on the sole basis that it required 
him to prove that the Hospital's negligence proximately caused Mrs. George's death. (Tr. 
889-91.) However, such proof is always necessary in a wrongful death action. See 22A 
Am. Jur. 2d, Death § 48 (1988). Plaintiff never objected to instructions 16a and 21a on 
the grounds addressed by the court of appeals. Accordingly, supposed error in those 
instructions cannot serve as a basis for a new trial. 
C. Instructions 16a and 21a Did Not Preclude Consideration of Expert Testimony On 
Breach Of Duty 
As detailed in Point I, above, the court of appeals apparently confused causation, 
which was at issue, with breach of duty, which was not at issue. The court's review of the 
testimony of plaintiffs experts focuses entirely on breach of duty; causation is never 
mentioned. In fact, the court states that plaintiffs experts testified "only to the standards 
of care." (Slip Op. at 6.) The court's conclusion is that "[t]he jury must be allowed to 
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decide whether the hospital's failure to notify the doctors . . . was a breach of the duty." 
(Slip Op. at 7.) 
However, nothing in instructions 16a and 21a prevented the jury from considering 
and deciding whether the Hospital breached its duty. Instruction 16a expressly requires 
the jury to consider whether defendants "failed to exercise that degree of reasonable care 
and skill in caring for the plaintiff that was ordinarily possessed and used by others in the 
respective profession practicing in . . . similar communities under similar circumstances." 
(App. 21-22.) Obviously, the jury considered and applied this instruction because it found 
that the Hospital did breach its duty of care. (App. 12.) Nothing could possibly be 
gained from retrying the issue of breach of duty. Instruction 21a has nothing to do with 
breach of duty; it pertains only to proof of proximate cause. (App. 24.) It could not 
possibly have had any bearing on the jury's consideration of breach of duty. Neither did 
the court of appeals make any mention or give any indication that instruction 21a 
erroneously instructed the jury on proof of causation. Whether that is what the court was 
thinking or intended is, of course, impossible to tell. The court's express holding is limited 
to the notion that instructions 16a and 21a precluded consideration of expert testimony 
oh breach of duty. That actual holding is plainly wrong. 
D. Instructions 16a and 21a Did Not Preclude A Finding Of More Than One 
Proximate Cause 
The court of appeals focused on the Hospital's breach of duty to conclude that the 
Hospital staff may have contributed to Mrs. George's demise by increasing the risk of 
harm to her or by depriving her of a chance for earlier treatment. The court ordered a 
new trial because jury instructions 16a and 21a "improperly implied that the jury could 
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find only one proximate cause of Mrs. George's death." (Slip Op. at 9.) However, the 
court completely confused the relevant issues. 
To begin with, neither of the challenged instructions states that the jury could find 
only one proximate cause of Mrs. George's death. They speak of proximate cause in the 
general sense. Moreover, jury instruction 21, which defines "proximate cause," expressly 
states that M[t]here may be more than one proximate cause for an injury." (App. 23.) 
The instructions must be read as a whole, and the jury was so instructed. (Instruction 5, 
App. 19.) See Goode v. Dayton Disposal, supra. Accordingly, when viewed in conjunction 
with Instruction 21, Instructions 16a and 21a clearly do not "impl[y] that the jury could 
find only one proximate cause." 
Plaintiff made the argument of contributing proximate cause in the context of his 
proposed jury instructions 24 and 32, pertaining to "increased risk of injury" and "lost 
chance of survival," respectively. (App. 35-36.) However, plaintiff failed to preserve the 
argument for appeal by objecting to refusal of the instructions in the trial court. See 
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 358 n.7 (Utah 1975)(party must have proposed correct 
instruction and excepted to the trial court's failure to give it); Newsome v. Gold Cross 
Services, Inc., 779 P.2d 692 (Utah App. 1989)(plaintiff precluded from asserting error in 
denial of "lost chance of survival" instruction). Furthermore, proposed instructions 24 and 
32 have no support in Utah law. As demonstrated above, a showing of mere "increased 
risk of injury" or "reduced chance of recovery" is too slender a reed on which to base 
malpractice liability. Utah law requires proof of proximate cause to a degree of 
"reasonable medical probability.19 The Hospital's expert physician witnesses all testified that 
while sepsis "may be reversible" and "may be treatable" in some cases, nothing the Hospital 
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staff could have done in this case would have changed Mrs. George's condition or 
prevented her death. In other words, even if the nurses had notified the doctors at the 
times identified by the court of appeals, the outcome would not have changed because 
Mrs. George's condition was, by that time, irreversible. The jury reasonably believed that 
evidence; its verdict is supported by that evidence; and the court of appeals may not 
substitute its judgment for that of the jury. 
In summary, instructions 16a and 21a did not preclude a finding of contributing 
proximate cause, and plaintiffs proposed instructions 24 and 32 were properly not 
considered on appeal. 
E. The Jury Instructions Taken As A Whole Reveal No Prejudicial Error 
Rule 61, Utah R. Civ. P., prohibits the ordering of a new trial unless the claimed 
error affects the "substantial rights" of the claiming party. (App. 42.) If the verdict would 
likely have been the same even without the challenged instructions, then any claimed error 
must be considered harmless. See Ramon v. Fair, 770 P.2d 131, 137 (Utah 1989). In this 
case, the court of appeals was mistaken as to the scope and effect of jury instructions 16a 
and 21a, and the court did not prescribe any additional instructions. Accordingly, a new 
trial, even without the challenged instructions, would likely have the same result. See 
Watters v. Queny, 626 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1981)(flaw in instructions related to negligence 
cannot justify reversal of judgment based on lack of causation alone). 
In denying plaintiffs motion for new trial, Judge Brian also concluded that any 
error in the trial was harmless: 
The law never contemplated, in all of the annals of recorded case law, that 
a given case would be without error. It would be impossible for a trial to 
be error free. 
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The Court has carefully considered all of the assertions and allegations 
and factors asserted by Plaintiff, in Plaintiffs motion for a new trial. The 
Court is convinced and persuaded that error may well have been committed 
by all of the participants in this case. But the Court is strongly persuaded 
that any error committed, in the totality of the trial, was harmless, that the 
trial was fair, that the case was vigorously presented, the jury was properly 
instructed, and that the verdict was a fair and an appropriate verdict, in light 
of the facts and the law. [Tr. of Motion for New Trial, R. 770, pp. 34-35.] 
In summary, there is no basis for a new trial. See Rule 59, Utah R. Civ. P. (App. 40-
41.) 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
to correct the errors in this decision of the court of appeals and to dispel the confusion 
that it creates in the law of medical malpractice. 
DATED this M^~ day of October, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant-Petitioner 
LDS Hospital 
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DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Plaintiffs, the husband and heirs of decedent Betty 
George, sought recovery in a wrongful death action against LDS 
Hospital, Dr. Kimball Lloyd, and Dr. Michael Lahey. Plaintiffs 
appeal from a jury verdict finding that defendant LDS Hospital 
was negligent in its care of Mrs. George, but that defendant's 
negligence was not a proximate cause of Mrs. George's death. 
Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey reached a settlement with the 
plaintiffs prior to trial, although the doctors remained in the 
case for purposes of determining comparative negligence. The 
jury concluded that the doctors were not negligent and assigned 
100 percent responsibility to the hospital. 
Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was denied by the trial 
court. On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial court 
committed reversible error in the jury instructions. We 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
FACTS 
On July 28, 1986, Dr. Lloyd admitted Mrs. George to LDS 
Hospital for a hysterectomy and exploratory surgery. The 
surgery was performed on July 29 without apparent 
complications. On the morning of July 30, Dr. Lloyd ordered 
that Mrs. George be ambulated four times daily, that she 
receive incentive spirometry1 every hour while awake, and 
that the nurses instruct her to cough and breathe deeply. This 
treatment was intended to increase Mrs. George's breath 
capacity, which is typically depressed following a patient's 
abdominal surgery. 
Mrs. George's breathing deteriorated during July 31. On 
the morning of August 1, Dr. Lloyd ordered that a chest X-ray 
and lung profusion scan be taken to determine whether Mrs. 
George had a pulmonary embolism. Although these tests proved 
negative for a pulmonary embolism, they did indicate the 
possibility of bilateral atelectasis.2 In the early 
afternoon of August 1, Dr. Lloyd called in Dr. Lahey and the 
hospital's respiratory therapy department to assist him in 
resolving Mrs. George's pulmonary condition. 
Dr. Lloyd ordered that Mrs. George undergo an angiogram in 
a further attempt to determine whether she had a pulmonary 
embolism. Mrs. George was taken to the intensive care unit 
(ICU) for an angiogram at 10:20 a.m. on August 2. The 
angiogram was completed at about 1:00 p.m., at which time Dr. 
Lloyd learned that the test result for a pulmonary embolism was 
negative. 
A nurse found that Mrs. George was having difficulty 
breathing, and that Mrs. George was incoherent upon returning 
1. An incentive spirometer measures the volume of air entering 
and leaving the lungs. Use of the device expands a patient's 
diaphragm, while also providing an incentive for a patient to 
breathe more deeply. 
2. Atelectasis is the collapse of an expanded lung, resulting 
in an insufficient flow of air to the lung's air sacs. 
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from ICU at 2:20 p.m. She did not inform Dr. Lloyd of this 
condition. The charge nurse telephoned Dr. Lloyd at about 3:00 
p.m. to inform him that Mrs. George had returned to OB/GYN from 
ICU, but she also failed to notify Dr. Lloyd of Mrs. George's 
deteriorating physical and mental condition. 
At 3:00 p.m., another nurse took over the care of Mrs. 
George. This nurse was a one-to-one special-duty nurse, whose 
only assignment was to monitor Mrs. George's condition. At 
about 3:30 p.m., a written notation was made in the chart that 
Mrs. George was disoriented and incoherent. A second-year 
resident physician was unable at this time to determine Mrs. 
George's blood pressure and the nurses had difficulty making 
Mrs. George bleed for a glucose test. Neither Dr. Lloyd nor 
Dr. Lahey were informed of these adverse changes in Mrs. 
George's condition. 
At about 4:00 p.m., the resident physician telephoned Dr. 
Lloyd to tell him that Mrs. George was febrile. Dr. Lloyd was 
not informed during this conversation that Mrs. George 
exhibited symptoms of hypoxia and he did not receive further 
reports until being told of Mrs. George's cardiac arrest. Dr. 
Lahey did not receive any further medical reports until 7:00 
p.m., at which time he also was told that Mrs. George had 
suffered a cardiac arrest. 
The record indicates that the resident physician did not 
visit Mrs. George between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. The record 
also shows that the special-duty nurse failed to continuously 
monitor Mrs. George and to notify a supervisor of Mrs. George's 
respiratory distress. Furthermore, the special-duty nurse was 
not even in the room when Mrs. George stopped breathing and 
suffered her first cardiac arrest. 
Mrs. George stopped breathing in front of her visiting 
daughter at about 7:00 p.m. The daughter then had to run out 
of the hospital room in search of a nurse. A code was called 
at 7:04 p.m., in which cardiopulmonary resuscitation was sought 
for Mrs. George. Breathing assistance for Mrs. George was 
initiated at about 7:13 p.m. During the interval between the 
cessation of breathing and breathing assistance being 
initiated, Mrs. George suffered a lack of oxygen to her brain. 
Although her heart beat was reestablished, Mrs. George was 
comatose after the cardiac arrest. Two days later, Mrs. George 
died following a second cardiac arrest. 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Two of the trial court's jury instructions are at issue in 
this action. The court's Jury Instruction #16A provided: 
The plaintiff in this case cannot recover 
against the doctors or the hospital unless 
it is proven, that, 
1. Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey 
or LDS Hospital's nursing staff or 
respiratory therapist or all of them, 
based on a degree of reasonable medical 
probability, failed to exercise that 
degree of reasonable care and skill in 
caring for the plaintiff that was 
ordinarily possessed and used by others in 
the respective profession practicing in 
1986 in Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar 
communities under similar circumstances; 
2. Based on a degree of reasonable 
medical probability established through 
expert medical testimony from a duly 
qualified medical doctor, that such 
failure, if any, was the proximate cause 
of the death of Betty George; and 
3. That David George personally, and the 
heirs of Betty George, and the 
representative of the estate of Betty 
George, was damaged by the negligence, if 
any, of one of the defendants or all of 
them. 
If you do not find, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, all of the foregoing 
propositions with regard to either Dr. 
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS 
Hospital, the party or parties, as the 
case may be, against whom any one 
proposition is not found cannot be found 
to have committed medical malpractice and 
your verdict must be in favor of the 
defendant or defendants. If you find that 
the evidence is evenly balanced on any of 
the above-mentioned issues, then your 
e n n i n n /-»* A 
verdict should be for the defendant or 
defendants on whose behalf the evidence is 
evenly balanced. 
The court's Jury Instruction #21A provided: 
You are instructed that where the 
proximate cause of Betty George's death 
and therefore the injury or loss claimed 
by plaintiff is not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence based on 
reasonable medical probability from 
testimony of a medical doctor, but is left 
to conjecture or speculation and may be 
reasonably attributed to causes over which 
the hospital or doctor had no control or 
responsibility/ then the plaintiff has 
failed to sustain the burden of proof as 
to proximate causation. 
The jury returned a special verdict finding LDS Hospital 
negligent in its care of Mrs. George, but not finding that the 
negligence was a proximate cause of Mrs. George's death. 
Plaintiffs claim on appeal that jury instructions #16A and #21A 
prevented the jury from meaningfully considering the testimony 
of plaintiffs' expert witnesses. Plaintiffs also claim that 
jury instructions #16A and #21A precluded the jury from 
awarding damages where the hospital's negligence was only a 
contributing proximate cause of Mrs. George's death. 
EXPERT WITNESSES 
The trial court admitted the testimony of plaintiffs' 
expert witnesses, respiratory therapist Donald Owings and nurse 
Harriett Gillerman, to explain the hospital's duty to Mrs. 
George and the hospital's breach of this duty. Owings 
testified that a respiratory therapist has a duty to notify a 
physician or other supervisor if a patient does not respond to 
respiratory therapy. Based on Mrs. George's failure to respond 
to the prescribed respiratory therapy, Owings offered his 
expert opinion that the hospital's respiratory therapist 
breached his duty by failing to notify the proper persons of 
Mrs. George's deteriorating pulmonary condition. 
Nurse Gillerman testified that ambulation and incentive 
spirometry are used to prevent and treat atelectasis. 
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Gillerman offered her expert opinion that the nurses, in 
failing to follow physician's orders to have Mrs. George 
ambulated and to use incentive spirometry on August 1, thereby 
breached their duty to her. Gillerman also testified that the 
nurses breached their duty by failing to perform a neurological 
assessment of Mrs. George when Mrs. George showed discernible 
signs of respiratory distress or hypoxia and by failing to 
timely notify the doctors of her rapidly deteriorating 
condition. 
Defendant counters that an expert witness cannot testify 
about an area of medicine in which he or she is not personally 
familiar. The record clearly indicates, however, that 
Gillerman and Owings testified only to the standards of care in 
their respective fields. The trial court recognized these 
witnesses as experts and admitted their testimony, yet the 
court, through the jury instructions, prevented the jury from 
considering their testimony.3 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[a]n appeal 
challenging the refusal to give jury instructions presents 
questions of law only. Therefore, we grant no particular 
deference to the trial court's rulings." Ramon By And Through 
Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). The parties in 
this case dispute the trial court's conclusions of law as 
stated in the jury instructions. 
This court has stated that "[i]n medical malpractice 
actions the plaintiff must provide expert testimony to 
establish: 1) the standard of care, 2) defendant's failure to 
comply with that standard, and 3) that defendant caused 
plaintiff's injuries." Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health 
Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations 
omitted); see Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 
1980). Plaintiff's experts testified as to the hospital's 
standard of care, the hospital's failure through its employees 
to meet this standard, and Mrs. George's subsequent cardiac 
arrest. 
Courts have recognized that "[n]urses are specialists in 
hospital care who, in the final analysis, hold the well-being, 
3. This error was compounded by the court consistently stating 
throughout trial that cause of death was not an issue in the 
case and that expert testimony need not address that subject, 
only to then give a jury instruction focusing on causation as 
established by medical testimony. 
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in fact in some instances, the very lives of patients in their 
hands." Utter v. United HQSP. Center, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 213, 
216 (W.Va. App. 1977), reh'q denied (1977) (negligent failure 
of nurses to observe plaintiffs condition). Courts have also 
recognized that a nurse may have a duty to notify her 
supervisor that a life-threatening situation exists and that 
failure to perform this duty may be a proximate cause of 
plaintiff's additional injury. See Campbell v. Pitt County 
Memorial HQSP. Inc., 352 S.E.2d 902, 908-9 (N.C. App. 1987). 
The jury must be allowed to decide whether the hospital's 
failure to notify the doctors of Mrs. George's change in 
medical status, which may have indicated either hypoxia or 
sepsis, was a breach of the duty owed to Mrs. George. The 
trial court erred in not allowing the jury to base its decision 
on the plaintiffs' expert testimony. See Karriaan v. Nazareth 
Convent & Academy, Inc., 510 P.2d 190, 196 (Kan. 1973), reh'a 
denied (1973) (nurses' delay in notifying physician of 
plaintiff's condition); see also Darling v. Charleston 
Community Memorial HQSP., 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (111. 1965), 
reh'g denied (1965) (nurses failed to recognize and inform 
physician of change in patient's condition, where the condition 
became irreversible within a matter of hours). 
PROXIMATE CAUSE 
According to the hospital pathologist, the combination of 
atelectasis, pulmonary embolism, and sepsis probably led to 
hypoxia and this, in turn, resulted in Mrs. George's first 
cardiac arrest and subsequent death. Both parties agreed that 
hypoxia and sepsis were significant contributing causes of Mrs. 
George's death. Plaintiffs' and defendant's expert witnesses 
also agreed that sepsis and pulmonary embolism produce similar 
symptoms. 
Defendant argues that Mrs. George would inevitably have 
died of sepsis after 2:20 p.m. on August 2, that her septic 
condition was not caused by negligence, and that any negligence 
on the hospital's part was therefore not a proximate cause of 
Mrs. George's death.4 The medical record shows that sepsis 
4. Such an argument is problematic. It would be unacceptable, 
for obvious policy reasons, to permit hospitals or doctors to 
escape responsibility for the negligent treatment of gravely 
ill persons upon a showing that the patient's condition was 
terminal and he or she was going to die anyway. 
*7 
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was not diagnosed until August 3, the day after Mrs. George's 
first cardiac arrest. Plaintiffs assert that the hospital's 
negligent failure to notify Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. 
George's deteriorating condition at a minimum contributed to 
her continued deterioration and may have hastened her death by 
depriving her of the chance to receive earlier diagnosis and 
treatment. 
Although defendant asserts that Mrs. George's death due to 
sepsis was inevitable, defendant's expert witness, Dr. Charles 
Elliot, testified under cross-examination that sepsis may be 
reversible. Dr. Lewis Weinstein, another of defendant's expert 
witnesses, testified under cross-examination that sepsis may be 
treatable, that sepsis did not occur instantaneously in Mrs. 
George's case, and that prompt treatment of sepsis may 
facilitate a patient's recovery. The record therefore does 
support plaintiff's argument that the nurses' failure to notify 
Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. George's deteriorating condition 
may well have prevented the doctors from timely diagnosing and 
treating her. 
"[E]vidence which shows to a reasonable certainty that 
negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment increased the need 
for or lessened the effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to 
establish proximate cause." James v. United States, 483 F. 
Supp. 581, 585 (N.D. Ca. 1980). Another court found the 
defendant's assertion that operating upon the patient in a 
timely manner would not have increased her chance of survival 
unsupported by the record. See Hicks v. United States, 368 
F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966). The Hicks court concluded that 
defendant's "negligence nullified whatever chance of recovery 
she might have had and was the proximate cause of the death." 
Ifl. at 633. 
In a case where the chances of saving a patient's life 
would have been increased if a physician had been timely 
notified of the patient's condition, a court found that whether 
the nonfeasance of the nurses was a contributing proximate 
cause of death was a question of fact. See Goff v. Doctors 
General HOSP. of San Jose, 333 P.2d 29, 33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1958). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found error in a trial 
court's jury instructions because of "the unmistakable 
implication in this passage that defendant's negligence had to 
be the sole cause of death in order to bring liability to the 
defendant when, in fact, liability could attach if the 
negligence of the defendant were but a substantial factor in 
bringing about the death." Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 
890171-CA 8 
1289 (Pa. 1978) reh'g denied (1978)(original emphasis). Hamil 
relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(a)(196575 
as authority for the proposition that liability may be found 
where negligence increases a party's risk of harm. 
A jury could have reasonably concluded that the failure of 
the nurses to notify Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. George's 
change in condition prevented them from diagnosing, treating, 
and possibly saving her life and that this failure therefore 
was a proximate cause of her worsened condition and ensuing 
death. See Morris, The Negligent Nurse — The Physician and 
the Hospital. 33 Baylor L.R. 109, 116 (1981) (the significance 
of proximate cause as applied to a nurse's negligence). The 
trial court's jury instructions therefore improperly implied 
that the jury could find only one proximate cause of Mrs. 
George's death. 
Based upon the errors arising from the improper jury 
instructions, we reverse and remand for a new trial against 
defendant LDS Hospital. The verdict of no cause of action 
against the defendant doctors is affirmed. 
5. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(1965) provides that: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as 
necessary for the protection of the 
other's person or things, is subject to 
liability to the other for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to perform his 
undertaking, if (a) his failure to 
exercise such care increases the risk of 
such harm . . . . 
890171-CA 9 
Because we remand for new trial, it is unnecessary to reach 
the other issues raised by appellant. 
C2u(^Q^^ 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Gregorfy K. Orme, Judge 
1 0 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID GEORGE, et al. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., MICHAEL 
LAHEY, M.D., and INTERMOUNTAIN 
HEALTH CARE, dba LDS HOSPITAL 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. C-87-4199 
Judge Pat Brian 
At the end of each proposition submitted to you, indicate 
your finding by placing an "X" in the appropriate line. If 
there' is preponderance of the evidence in favor of the 
proposition, indicate by finding "yes." If there is 
preponderance of the evidence against the proposition, indicate 
by finding "no." If there is no preponderance of the evidence 
either way on the proposition, indicate by answering "no." 
We, the jury in this action, find the answers to the 
questions propounded to us, as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1 
A. Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of Betty 
George? 
ANSWER: Yes„ No x 
B. If you answered "yes" to question No. 3A above, then 
and only then answer the following question: Was the negligence 
of Dr. Kimball Lloyd a proximate cause of the death of Betty 
George &nd the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of 
Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 2 
A. Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of Betty 
George? 
ANSWER:- Yes No x 
B. If you answered "yes" to question No. 2A above, then 
and only then answer the following question: Was the negligence 
of Dr. Michael Lahey a proximate cause of the death of Betty 
George and the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of 
Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 3 
A. Was LDS Hospital through its nursing staff and/or 
respiratory therapists negligent in their care of Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes ^ No 
B. If you answered "yes" to No. 3A above, then answer 
the following question: Was the negligence of LDS Hospital 
including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory therapists, a 
12 
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proxiitate cause of the death of Betty George and the damages claimed by 
David George and the heirs of Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
If you answered "no" to question 3A or 3B, or if you found no 
preponderance of the evidence either way, then answer no further questions, 
QUESTION NO. 4 
What is the amount of damages, if any, sustained by David George, 
and the heirs of Betty George and the estate of Betty George? Ihis question 
should be answered only if you answered "yes" to question No. 3A and 3B. 
General Damages 
a. loss of consortium $ 
b. Pain and suffering of Betty George $ 
Special Damages including: 
a. Funeral and Burial expenses $ 
b. Medical expenses $ 
c. Lost incane, benefits and household services $ 
QUESTION NO. 5 
Assessing a percentage only to a party or parties found negligent, 
considering the negligence to amount to 100 percent, what percentage of 
negligence is attributed to: 
a. Dr. Kiniball Uoyd % 
b. Dr. Michael lahey % 
c. LDS Hospital, its nurses 
and/or respiratory therapists 
% 
Total 100 % 
-3-
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Dated this T ^ d a v of A/ofetv-tev . 1988. 
V. 
JURY FOREPERS 
1' 1 
_4. 
Thirci Jucicial District 
Brinton R. Burbidge - A049I 
Larry R. White - A3446 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID GEORGE, individually and 
as personal representative of 
the Estate of Betty George, and 
as personal representative for 
the heirs of Betty George, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., MICHAEL 
LAHEY, M.D., and INTERMOUNTAIN 
HEALTH CARE, dba LDS HOSPITAL, 
Defendant. 
This matter came on for trial on October 31, 1988, 
before the Honorable Pat B. Brian and the juVy impaneled. After 
the close of evidence on November 9, 1988, special 
interrogatories concerning the liability, if any, of the 
defendants for the claims of the plaintiff were submitted to the 
jury in the form of a Special Verdict. They jury answered the 
following questions as set forth below: 
MAR 2 1989 
V*JWM (Y 
Deputy Clerk 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-87-4199 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
A tJ 
Question No. 1 
A. Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of 
Betty George?. 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
Question No. 2 
A. Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of 
Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
Question No. 3 
A. Was LDS Hospital through its nursing staff and/or 
respiratory therapists negligent in their care of Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
B. If you answered "yes" to number 3A above, then 
answer the following question: Was the negligence of LDS 
Hospital including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory 
therapists, a proximate cause of the death of Betty George and 
the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of Betty 
George? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
Based on the verdict of the jury the Court determines 
that a judgment of no cause of action should be entered in favor 
of Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey and Intermountain Health 
Care, dba LDS Hospital and against David George in his 
individual and representative capacities. 
1 G 
-2-
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Judgment of no cause of action should be and is 
hereby awarded in favor of the defendants, Dr. Kimball Lloyd, 
Dr. Michael Lahey and Intermountain Health Care, dba LDS 
Hospital, and against David George in his individual and 
representative capacity. 
2. That the plaintiff David George, individually and 
as personal representative of the estate of Betty George and 
heirs of Betty George and heirs of Betty George take nothing by 
his complaint. 
3. The defendant, Intermountain Health Care, dba LDS 
Hospital, should be and is hereby awarded its costs in this 
action in the amount of $ Ml. 0- . 
DATED this*?-th- day of Febrtrary, 1989. 
DISTRICT COURT 
Pat B. Brian 
District Judge 
-3- 17 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
""7 
the follov/ing: 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Final Judgment was mailed this ^l \ day of 
£^^T, 1989, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, to 
Stephen Russell, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
415 Judge Building 
#8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Elliott J. Williams, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Lloyd 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
J. Anthony Eyre, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Defendant Lahey 
1 City Centre, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
If in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is 
stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none 
should be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single 
out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction 
as more important than the others, but you are to consider all the 
instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all 
the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no 
significance as to their relative importance. 
19 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ( V 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence each of the following propositions: 
1. That LDS Hospital, through its employees, failed to 
comply with the applicable medical standard of care, and that in 
so acting or failing to act, LDS Hospital was negligent. 
2. That the plaintiffs to this action were injured as a 
result of that negligence. 
3. That the negligence of LDS Hospital, through its 
employees, was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the 
plaintiffs. 
4. The nature and extent of the injuries and damage, and 
the amount thereof. 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater 
weight of the evidence, that is, such evidence as, when weighed 
with that opposed to it, is more convincing as to its truth. 
£0 
nr\r\ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The plaintiff in this case cannot recover against the 
doctors or the hospital unless it is proven, that, 
1. Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS 
Hospital's nursing staff or respiratory therapist or all of 
them, based on a degree of reasonable medical probability, 
failed to exercise that degree of reasonable care and skill in 
caring for the plaintiff that was ordinarily possessed and used 
by others in the respective profession practicing in 1986 in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar communities under similar 
circumstances; 
2. Based on a degree of reasonable medical probability 
established through expert medical testimony from a duly 
qualified medical doctor, that such failure, if any, was the 
proximate cause of the death of Betty George; and 
3. That David George personally, and the heirs of Betty 
George, and the representative of the estate of Betty George, 
was damaged by the negligence, if any, of one of the defendants 
or all of them. 
If you do not find, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
all of the foregoing propositions with regard to either Dr. 
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS Hospital, the party or 
parties, as the case may be, against whom any one proposition i 
not found cannot be found to have committed medical malpractice 
and your verdict must be in favor of that defendant or 
defendants. If you find that the evidence is evenly balanced on 
any of the above-mentioned issues, then your verdict should be 
for the defendant or defendants on whose behalf the evidence is 
evenly balanced. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO . */ 
The proximate cause of an injury is that which, in natural 
and continuous sequence produces the injury, and without which the 
result would not have occurred. There may be more than one 
proximate cause for an injury. 
& <J 
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INSTRUCTION NO. * 
You are instructed that where the proximate cause of 
Betty George's death and therefore the injury or loss claimed by 
plaintiff is not established by a preponderance of the evidence 
based on reasonable medical probability from testimony of a 
medical doctor, but is left to conjecture or speculation and may 
be reasonably attributed to causes over which the hospital or 
doctor had no control or responsibility, then the plaintiff has 
failed to sustain the burden of proof as to proximate 
causation. 
O 4 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Negligence" means the failure of a party to do what a 
reasonably prudent person practicing medicine, nursing, or 
acting as a respiratory therapist as the case may be, in July 
and August of 1986 in Salt Lake City, Utah, or in a similar 
community, would have done or would not have done under similar 
circumstances. The fault may be in acting or in omitting to act. 
In the context of this case, it was the duty of Dr. Lloyd 
and Dr. Lahey to exercise the same degree of care and skill in 
caring for the plaintiff as was possessed and exercised by other 
physicians specializing in obstetrics and gynecology and 
internal medicine in Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar 
communities in 1986. 
You are instructed that, because of Dr. Lloyd's 
specialized training, the standard of care for Dr. Lloyd in July 
and August of 1986, was the same as for other specialty trained 
obstetricians and gynecologists throughout the country. The 
required degree of care for him may only be established by 
medical experts. 
You are instructed that because of Dr. Lahey's 
specialized training, the standard of care for Dr. Lahey in 
August of 1986 was the same as for other speciality trained 
internists throughout the country. The required degree of care 
for him may only be established bv medical experts. 
o r 
In addition, it is the duty of the nurses or respiratory 
therapists to exercise the same degree of care and skill in 
caring for the plaintiff as was possessed and exercised by other 
nurses or respiratory therapists in Salt Lake City, Utah, or 
similar communities in July and August of 1986. The required 
degree of care for them may only be established by nursing or 
respiratory therapist experts. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. £ 3 
You are instructed that none of the defendants are 
obligated in any way to insure or guarantee a successful 
result. Therefore, you may not infer or presume the existence 
of negligerice merely from the fact that an adverse result arose 
in the treatment of Betty George. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. *Sl 
The duty of a hospital nurse or respiratory therapist is 
to exercise the same degree of care and skill in caring for a 
patient as is possessed and exercised by other hospitals, nurses 
or respiratory therapists of ordinary skill and learning in the 
same or in a similar community in July and August of 1986. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The duty of a nurse or respiratory therapist extends to 
caring for the patient in proportion to the physical ailments 
and conditions of the patient or which reasonably should have 
been known by the nurse or respiratory therapist, consistent 
with the physicians instructions for treatment of the patient. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ^ w 
Doctors, and a hospital's nurses and respiratory therapists 
have the duty to comply with the standard of care applicable in 
the same or similar localities as of the time of the events which 
are the subject of this lawsuit. The standard of care is not a 
"local" standard. 
SO 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. <^7 
A doctor, or a hospital, through its nurses and respiratory 
therapists, is liable for injuries and damage proximately caused 
by a failure to comply with the applicable standard of care, 
however good his or her intentions may have been in treating the 
patient. 
00^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The amount of caution and attention required in the 
exercise of a nurse's duty is measured by the patient's 
condition, the danger involved in the treatment, service and 
responsibility undertaken by the nurse, the information and 
instruction given her by the attending physician, and other 
surrounding circumstances. These are matters for your to 
consider in deciding whether or not the nurses at LDS Hospital 
were negligent. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ^ \ 
You are instructed that you are not permitted in a case 
such as this to arbitrarily set up your own standards in 
determining whether Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS 
Hospital was negligent in treating the plaintiff. You must use 
the standard established by the learning, skill and care 
ordinarily possessed and practiced by others of the profession 
in good standing in 1986 in Salt Lake City, Utah, or in similar 
localities under similar circumstances. The doctor, hospital 
nurse or respiratory therapist whose conduct is set up as the 
standard is one of reasonable and ordinary prudence. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO, ?& 
You must determine the applicable standard of care required 
of Dr. Lloyd, Dr. Lahey, and of LDS Hospital's nurses and 
respiratory therapists only from those persons who have testified 
as expert witnesses as to that standard in this case. 
o 1 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
If plaintiffs demonstrate that the acts or omissions of LDS 
Hospital increased the risk or harm to Betty George, such evidence 
furnishes a basis for you to go further and find that the 
increased risk was a proximate cause resulting in the death of 
Betty George, and the consequent injuries and damage suffered by 
her immediate family and Estate. 
AUTHORITY: 
GRADEL V. INOUYE, 421 A.2d 674, 678 (Pa. 1980); HAMIL V. 
BASHLINE, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978). 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 32 
In this case plaintiffs have alleged that the acts and 
omissions of LDS Hospital by and through its officers, agents and 
employees resulted in the failure of Betty George to receive the 
medical care necessary to save her life, and ability to continue 
living in a normal and productive fashion. Should you determine 
that the negligence of LDS Hospital effectively terminated Betty 
George's chance for a normal life, then you should disregard any 
conjecture as to the measure of the chance for a normal life that 
was eliminated. 
That is, if you find that the negligence of LDS Hospital 
destroyed a substantial possibility that Betty George might have 
survived and returned to a healthy, productive state, then 
defendants are liable for whatever injuries and damage was thereby 
proximately caused. 
AUTHORITY: 
HICKS V. U.S., 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966). 
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Rule 48 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on 
voir dire in personal injury or death action as 
to previous claims or actions for damages by 
himself or his family, 38 A.L.R.4th 267. 
Propriety of asking prospective female jurors 
questions on voir dire not asked of prospective 
male jurors, or vice versa, 39 A.L.R.4th 450. 
Visual impairment as disqualification, 48 
A.L.R.4th 1154. 
Professional or business relations between 
proposed juror and attorney as ground for chal-
lenge for cause, 52 A.L.R.4th 964. 
Validity of verdict awarding medical ex-
penses to personal injury plaintiff, but failing 
to award damages for pain and suffering, 55 
A.L.R.4th 186. 
Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on 
voir dire regarding previous claims or actions 
against himself or his family, 66 A.L.R.4th 
509. 
Examination and challenge of federal case 
jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexual-
ity, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 864. 
Key Numbers. — Jury *= 66, 72,112,114 to 
121, 125, 126, 131(1) to 133, 136, 148, 149; 
Trial •=> 28, 303,307,312,313,316,321,321V2, 
324, 325, 339, 340. 
Rule 48. Juries of less than eight — Majority verdict 
The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less 
than eight or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall 
be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 48, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Number of jurors, 
§ 78-46-5. 
Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in 
civil case, Utah Const, Art. I, Sec. 10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of Rule 47(q). 
Removal of municipal officer. 
Effect of Rule 47(q). 
Intent of Rule 47iq) is to allow the parties 
the opportunity to ensure that the requisite 
number of jurors concurred in the verdict; it is 
not a vehicle to bring into issue the court's in-
struction as to the number of concurring jurors 
required to reach a verdict. Madesen v. Brown, 
701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985). 
Removal of municipal officer. 
Removal of municipal officer does not re-
quire unanimous verdict by a jury; a three-
fourths majority is acceptable. Madesen v. 
Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 124 
et seq. 
C.J.S. — 50 CJ.S. Juries § 123; 89 CJ.S. 
Trial § 494. 
A.L.R. — Validity of agreement, by stipula-
tion or waiver in state civil case, to accept ver-
dict by number or proportion of jurors less than 
that constitutionally permitted, 15 A.L.R.4th 
213. 
Key Numbers. — Jury «=» 32(2); Trial «=» 
32V2. 
Rule 49. Special verdicts and interrogatories. 
(a) Special verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special 
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that 
event the court may submit to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of 
categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several 
special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and evi-
dence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring 
the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall 
give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus 
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submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon 
each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the 
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of 
the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission 
to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a 
finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in 
accord with the judgment on the special verdict. 
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories. The 
court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general 
verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of 
which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or 
instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to 
the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct 
the jury both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When 
the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judg-
ment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A. 
When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsis-
tent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58A 
in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the 
court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict 
or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other 
and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment 
shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for further consider-
ation of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 49, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Appeals. 
Where plaintiff did not object below, it can-
Ambiguous interrogatories or verdicts.
 n o t raise the failure to give special verdicts or 
Appeals. interrogatories on appeal without showing spe-
Discretion of court.
 cjaj circumstances warranting such a review. 
Effect of inconsistent answers Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 
Entering judgment in accordance with an- (Utah 1987) 
swers. 
Interest. Discretion of court. 
Objections to questions. The matter of entering judgment in accor-
Proximate cause issue. dance with the answers to special interrogator-
Role of jury. i e s is within the discretion of the trial judge. 
—Special verdicts. Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nel-
Special interrogatories. ^
 n U t a h 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (1960). 
^ted- Use of a special verdict is left to the discre-
Ambiguous interrogatories or verdicts. £ o n o f * « t r ? a l «>urt. Reiser v. Lohner, 641 
When special interrogatories or verdicts are ^ d 93 (Utah 1982). 
ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to J t 1S W l t h i n t h e b r o a d discretion of the tnal 
object to the filing of the verdict or to move c o u r t to determine if special interrogatories 
that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for are to De use<* a n d , if so used, the content 
clarification; if a party fails to take appropriate thereof. E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v. 
action before the discharge of the verdict, that W.C. Foy & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983). 
party generally may not later move for a new The use of special verdicts or interrogatories 
trial on the ground that the verdict was defec- is a matter for the trial court's sound discre-
tive. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., tion. Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 
701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985). 1239 (Utah 1987). 
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Rule 51 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(Utah 1982); Wilderness Bldg. Sys. v. Chap- Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah 
man, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Gagon v. State Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments fusal to direct verdict against him, 10 A.L.R.3d 
§§ 106 to 151; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 463 et 1330. 
^Q- Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
0 0
C ; J ;S« — J 9 , C.J.S. Judgments §§ 59 to 61; ^ affected by opponent's motion for summary 
88 C!JJS. Trial §§ 249 to 265 judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
A.L.R. — Dismissal, nonsuit, judgment, or J f , *J. , % c A T „ „ , ; 1 1 0 & 
direction of verdict on opening statement of ***** lerdl«> 3 6 A - L * ' 3 d \ 1 1 3 - ^
 f 
counsel in civil action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405. Key Numbers. — Judgment •=> 199; Trial «=» 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's 167 to 181. 
argument or comment as to trial judge's re-
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall inform counsel of its 
proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties 
stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive this 
requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all objections 
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, 
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the 
giving oH^hejaihire to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In object 
ing to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds for" his objection^ Notwithstanding the fore-
going requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of 
justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity 
shall be given to make objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of 
the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, 
and if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that 
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- Compiler's Notes. — This section varies 
ment, in the first paragraph, deleted "during substantially from Rule 51, F.R.C.P., after 
the trial" following "time" in the first sentence, which it is patterned. 
made a minor punctuation change in the sec- Cross-References. — Exceptions unneces-
ond sentence, and inserted "of" in the next-to- sa rv> Rule 46. 
last sentence; and substituted "jurors" for 
"jury" in the second sentence in the second 
paragraph. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfac-
tion and discharge operated to satisfy and dis-
charge everything merged in and adjudicated 
by the judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v. Keith 
O'Brien Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943. 
Owner or attorney. 
—Vacation of satisfaction. 
Hearing. 
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed 
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated with-
out action and hearing in equity, and the lien 
of an attorney against the proceeds of the judg-
ment does not include his personal right to exe-
cute against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V. 
Fed. Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 979 et seq. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 49 C J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 891 to 899. 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
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Court. 
—Duty. 
Attachment. 
Effect. 
—Acceptance of full payment. 
Owner or attorney. 
—Vacation of satisfaction. 
Hearing. 
Court 
—Duty. 
Attachment 
Court had duty to make order directing par-
tial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money 
collected through attachment proceeding. 
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805. 
Effect 
—Acceptance of full payment 
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay-
40 
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(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of cou r t Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
for new trial, § 21-2-2. 
Harmless error not ground for new trial, 
Rule 61. 
ANALYSIS 
Abandonment of motion. 
Accident or surprise. 
Arbitration awards. 
Caption on motion for new trial. 
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict. 
Correction of record. 
Costs. 
Decision against law. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Effect of order granting new trial. 
Effect of untimely motion. 
Evidence. 
—Sufficiency. 
Excessive or inadequate damages. 
Failure to object to findings of fact. 
Filing of affidavits. 
Incompetence or negligence of counsel. 
Misconduct of jury. 
Motion to alter or amend judgment. 
Motion to be presented to trial court. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
New trial on initiative of court. 
Particularization of grounds for motion for new 
trial. 
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial. 
Reconsideration of motion for new trial. 
Settlement bars appeal. 
Summary judgment. 
Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 606. 
Time for motion. 
Tolling time for appeal. 
Waiver. 
Cited. 
Abandonment of motion. 
Abandonment of motion for new trial must 
be intentional, and the facts must indicate this 
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 
1043 (Utah 1984). 
Accident or surprise. 
A "surprise" at trial which could have been 
easily guarded against by utilization of avail-
able discovery procedures may not serve as a 
ground for a new trial under Subdivison (a)(3). 
Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 339 (Utah 
1979). 
Failure to interpose a timely objection to tes-
timony challenged on the ground of surprise 
would be a sufficient reason to deny a motion 
for a new trial on that ground. Chournos v. 
D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982). 
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on 
the basis of surprise concerning testimony of 
the defendant's expert witness where the 
plaintiff failed to object to the testimony either 
before, or immediately after, it was given. 
Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977). 
Claim of error based on accident or surprise, 
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record. Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66,246 P.2d 
602 (1952). 
Where the affidavit for publication of sum-
mons presented no evidentiary facts, a default 
judgment entered against the defendant can be 
attacked collaterally. Bowen v. Olson, 122 
Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952). 
Unauthorized appearance. 
Wife who had been personally served with 
process but had no actual knowledge of action 
was not entitled to relief from judgment 
against her and her husband on ground that 
appearance for her by attorney retained by 
husband was without her authority. Plaintiff 
would have been entitled to default judgment 
against wife, and his position could not be 
worsened by unauthorized appearance over 
which he had no control. Brimhall v. Mecham, 
27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P.2d 525 (1972). 
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299, 
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Cox, 16 
Utah 2d 20, 395 P.2d 55 (1964); Parker v. 
Rolfson, 525 P.2d 612 (Utah 1974); Dynapac, 
Inc. v. Innovations, Inc., 550 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1976); Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123 
(Utah 1977); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 
589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978); Peay v. Peay, 607 
P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. 
Osborne, 622 R2d 800 (Utah 1981); Kohler v. 
Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); St. 
Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982); 
Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495 (Utah 1983); 
Pease v. Industrial Comrn'n, 694 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1984); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 
(Utah 1985); In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 
L345 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 
{Utah 1986); Myers v. Garff, 655 F. Supp. 1021 
(D. Utah 1987); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 
1318 (Utah 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 
L051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Blodgett v. Zions 
First Natl Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 101 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 48 (1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 200. 671 et seq. 
C.J.S.— 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 228 et seq., 
237. 
A.L.R. — Incompetence of counsel as ground 
for relief from state court civil judgment, 64 
A.L.R 4th 323. 
Relief from judicial error bv motion under 
F.RC.P. Rule 60(b)(1), 1 A.L.R Fed. 771. 
Propriety of conditions imposed in granting 
relief from judgment under Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. Fed. 956. 
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of 
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or 
other parts of the records and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A.L.R. 
Fed. 794. 
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing 
relief from final judgment where its prospec-
tive application is inequitable, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 
309. 
Independent actions to obtain relief from 
judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule 
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
53 A.L.R. Fed. 558. 
Lack of jurisdiction, or jurisdictional error, 
as rendering federal district court judgment 
"void" for purposes of relief under Rule 60(b)(4) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A.L.R. 
Fed. 831. 
Effect of Cling of notice of appeal on motion 
to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 A.L.R. Fed. 148. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment «= 294 et seq., 
306, 307. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturb-
ing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 61, F.R.C.P. 
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